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NOTES
cluded that, "since the servitude in this case has become extinct,
it cannot be re-created or established anew except by title."14
This holding seems to indicate that even an express renunciation
of acquired prescription, after ten years non-user, would not
effectively revest title in the mineral owner.
Defendants who had purchased a portion of Gleason's rights
contended that their reliance on the public records estopped
plaintiff from denying their ownership. There is some confusion
as to what faith can be placed in the public record when dealing
with mineral rights. In Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate15 the
court said, "The mineral and royalty owners who acquired their
rights on the faith of the public records after the ... agreement
was registered are obviously protected. '16 However, in subse-
quent cases the court has used such language as "[a] third per-
son purchasing, on the faith of the public records, . . .is only
required to ascertain if the recorded owner . . ." has kept the
servitude alive (italics supplied) 17 thus indicating that the rec-
ords could not be relied upon completely. In the instant case the
court held that one who purchases mineral rights must deter-
mine whether the rights have prescribed when the records show
that the servitude has been in existence more than ten years,
even if this entails a search behind the records.
Roy M. Lilly, Jr.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-RATE MAKING-PRUDENT INVESTMENT
THEORY-NON UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Appellant, Gulf States Utilities Company, applied to the
Louisiana Public Service Commission for authority to increase
its rates for electric service in the State of Louisiana. The com-
they have already been irrevocably divested by operation of law. In order to
show a renewal of their servitudes, they must prove Bailey's intention to
create new rights. . . . Acceptance of rentals under such circumstances does
not resurrect mineral servitudes which have become prescribed, either on
the theory of tacit renunciation or estoppel." The court in the Porter-Wadley
case did not give an opinion as to whether such a renunciation could be made.
14. 62 So. 2d 653, 656 (La. 1952).
15. 195 La. 866, 197 So. 583 (1940). In the Brown case there was a conflict
as to each alleged owner's share of the mineral estate. There was evidence
that some of the rights had prescribed. The interested parties executed a
pooling agreement which set forth each owner's respective share. This
instrument- was notarized and recorded, and other parties bought on the
faith of this instrument on the record.
16. 195 La. 866, 892, 197 So. 583, 592 (1940).
17. Braswell v. Columbia County Development Co., 153 La. 691, 694, 96 So.
534, 535 (1923).
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mission refused to authorize the increase on the ground that the
present earnings of appellant were substantial and were not
confiscatory.1 In computing the earnings, the commission included
profits from certain private contracts under which the company
supplied steam-electric power for industrial use. The district
court accepted this computation of appellant's earnings and sus-
tained the ruling of the commission. Held, that earnings from
the private operations of appellant should not be used to enhance
the rate of return produced by the normal public utility enter-
prise, and that denial to appellant of an increase sufficient to
allow a rate of return corresponding to that return allowed other
electric companies was discriminatory. Gulf States Utilities
Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 62 So. 2d 250
(La. 1952).
For many years the Louisiana Public Service Commission,
like other regulatory bodies, was required to follow the "fair
value" theory of utility regulation, established by Smyth v.
Ames,2 in order to comply with the due process provisions of the
Federal Constitution. This theory was based on the premise that
the owners of the utility were entitled to a fair return on the
current value of the property used and useful in performing
public service.3
Justice Brandeis introduced a completely different approach
to the problem in his concurring opinion in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company case.4 His "prudent investment" theory
suggested that the owner's investment was the thing to be pro-
tected in rate making, rather than the ever changing value of the
physical property of the utility.5 Thus, a rate of return sufficient
to protect the owner's investment and attract new capital was
the object of regulation, rather than a cumbersome, time-wasting
appraisal of the utility property. This prudent investment theory
was accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1944,1
and two years later it was adopted by the Louisiana Public
Service Commission.7
1. L.P.S.C. Order No. 5931.
2. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898).
3. Id. at 546.
4. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U.S. 276
(1923).
5. Id. at 306.
6. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
7. Louisiana Public Service Comm. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 65
P.U.R. (N.S.) 18, 22 (1946).
"Although this commission has in the past followed the 'fair value'
[VOL. XIII
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The Louisiana commission modified the theory to some extent
by adopting a rather unique method of treating the reserve for
depreciation of a company. Normally, the reserve for deprecia-
tion is deducted from the gross plant account to arrive at the
depreciable property to be included in the rate base along with
working capital and other allowed items.5 To this net base it
applied a percentage to arrive at the allowable return for the
company. The same result would, of course, be achieved by
applying the percentage to the gross rate base and the reserve
for depreciation respectively and netting the amounts thus arrived
at to get the allowable return. In the Louisiana Power & Light
Company case,9 however, the commission applied a lower rate
to the reserve for depreciation than to the undepreciated rate
base on the assumption that there is a certain time lag before
sums retained in the business by virtue of additions to the
theory in rate making proceedings, and although this process has been
approved by the Supreme Court of this State, this approval was required
by the former U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence of Federal due process.
Since there are no Louisiana decisions requiring use of the 'fair value' theory
in public utility rate making to meet State requirements of due process, and
since there are no state statutes directing use of the 'fair value' theory, it
is the opinion of this Commission that the Supreme Court of Louisiana is
free to allow the use of the 'prudent investment' theory in public utility rate
making by this Commission. Therefore, being desirous of simplifying the
rate making process by eliminating the necessity for and the use of the
cumbersome, expensive, time wasting and inconclusive reproduction ap-
praisals and studies used in the past, we herewith adopt the 'prudent invest-
ment' theory of rate making for public utilities and set out below our appli-
cation of this theory.
"The owners of a public utility are entitled to earn and receive a fair
rate of return upon the money prudently invested in property used and useful
in rendering public service. Money is prudently invested, even though it is
in excess of the original cost of the property purchased, if the excess of
purchase price over original cost was paid as the result of arm's-length
bargaining between non-associated buyer and seller, if the excess was neces-
sary for the integration of the property into a larger and more efficient
system, and if the purchase necessitating the excess did or reasonably
should have resulted in public benefit by improvement of service to custom-
ers or in lowered rates or both better service and lowered rates. This inte-
gration cost or excess of purchase price over original cost termed in pre-
scribed system of accounts as 'Utility Plant Acquisition Adjustments' should
remain a part of the prudent investment during the life of the physical
property to which it was applied, and its extinguishment from the investment
when and if required by the Commission, should be accomplished by amorti-
zation through annual charges to Operating Revenue Deductions during the
life of the property remaining after the date of the purchase which created
the excess.
"The rate base to be used in determining a fair return shall be the total
original cost of the property in useful service plus the allowable amount of
Utility Plant Acquisition Adjustments not amortized through charges to
Operating Revenue Deductions plus a reasonable allowance for materials and
supplies and for cash working capital, less the amount of capital secured
from customers as contributions and construction advances."
8. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1934).
9. 65 P.U.R. (N.S.) 18 (1946).
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reserve for depreciation account can be reinvested in revenue
producing equipment. 10 In recent cases involving electric utili-
ties the commission has applied a 6 per cent rate of return to the
undepreciated rate base of a 5% per cent rate to the reserve for
depreciation," with a resultant net rate in excess of 6 per cent.
The formula was abandoned sub silentio in the Gulf States
matter.
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered
for the first time a utility rate dispute involving application of
the prudent investment theory as adopted by the commission. The
court reaffirmed the proposition it had set forth in Morgan's L. &
T.R. & S.S. Company v. Railroad Commission 2 that the primary
issue for decision in rate cases is whether the rate fixed is reason-
able and just. Thus, this court, like most courts when confronted
with a rate problem, restated its position that the end result is
more important than the means used to attain that result.
In considering the appeal of Gulf States, the Supreme Court
first discussed the question on the basis of the commission's own
computations, which included the profit from private sales, and
set appellant's rate of return at 5.11 per cent. Even accepting
this figure, the court decided that the refusal of the commission
to allow a rate increase was "somewhat discriminatory."'' It
based its reasoning upon the fact that in twenty-nine similar
cases since the commission adopted the prudent investment
theory, it had allowed a rate return of 6 per cent. The court held
that "refusal to grant an applicant a rate increase which would
enable it to earn 6 per cent would be inequitable and unjust in
the absence of exceptional circumstances.1 4 Thus, the court
seemed to adopt the view that, in the absence of special circum-
stances, the rate of return of a utility should correspond to the
rate allowed other utilities furnishing the same type of service.
This will probably mean that in future rate cases the emphasis
must be placed upon the exceptional circumstances which will
distinguish a particular utility from other members of the homo-
geneous group into which it would naturally fall.
10. Id. at 25.
11. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 62 So. 2d
250, 253 (La. 1952).
12. Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 127 La. 636, 53 So.
890 (1910).
13. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 62 So. 2d
250 (La. 1952).
14. Ibid.
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How does this expression of the court affect the prudent
investment theory in Louisiana? Itmay limit its application to
some extent. When the commission adopted the theory in 1946,
it said that the rate of return of the utility would be based on
the "efficiency of operation of the subject utility, market prices,
and ratio of earnings to the market value of stocks and bonds of
similar enterprises operating under similar conditions, and any
other relevant facts."'15 Now the court seems to say that these
factors may be used to determine the rate of return, but that
here they did not constitute such exceptional circumstances as to
warrant a rate different from the rate of return allowed other
utilities furnishing similar services.
As a matter of fact, however, the instant case was not decided
on the basis of the 5.11 per cent rate of return computed by the
commission. The court refused to allow the profit from the
private sales of steam-electric power to subsidize the normal
utility operations of the company, and, therefore, the court
considered the case as one in which the commission had allowed
a rate of return of 4.35 per cent.
If income from the private contracts was correctly excluded
from the utility income, and the rate of 4.35 per cent was correct,
there can be little doubt that the commission's refusal to allow
an increase was discriminatory. Therefore, the decisive issue
in the instant case was whether or not the profit from the private
contracts was properly included in the determination of the
actual rate of return of appellant.
The subject of the private contracts is a combination of
electrical energy and steam supplied by Gulf States to Standard
Oil Company and Ethyl Corporation.16 The special equipment
necessary to supply this energy was included in the rate base in
the present case. The power plant from which the energy is
supplied is not used exclusively for industrial operations. In
fact, it contains other standard generators, and, more important,
all the electric energy produced goes through one control room
and can be sold to the industries, or can be sold to the normal
utility customers.17 This presents a strong indication that the
combined operations of appellant might properly have been
15. Louisiana Public Service Comm. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 65
P.U.R. (N.S.) 18, 23 (1946).
16. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 62 So. 2d
250, 251 (La. 1952).
17. L.P.S.C. Order No. 5931, at 7.
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treated as a unit for rate making purposes. Other courts have
considered problems similar to the present one, but usually the
problems have arisen in a different context. The normal utility
operations have more often been making a greater profit than
the special activity under consideration.
In Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Company,'8 in addition to
the rate for gas supplied for general consumption in the city of
New York, there was a lower rate for that furnished to the city
itself. It was said by the court that the criticism of the "whole-
sale" rate to the city was met by the fact that the total returns
from the sale of gas were adequate. Is there a great difference in
principle between the supplying of this gas to New York City
and the furnishing of steam-electric power for industrial use
in the instant case?
In Illinois Commerce Commission v. Public Service Company
of Northern Illinois,19 an electric utility leased some of its most
valuable territories to another company for a large proportion of
the gross income, and the commission ruled that the income
from the leased property should be considered income of the
company from its electric properties for the purpose of rate
determination. Both of the above mentioned cases deal with
situations in which the product furnished under the auxiliary
agreement and the basic product of the utility are the same. The
question becomes more difficult if the products sold or the serv-
ices rendered are dissimilar.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a con-
fiscatory rate which was applied to a particular class of traffic
of a railroad could not be justified on the ground that income
from other classes of traffic offset the loss. 20 However, the court
did point out that in evaluating the reasonableness of a particular
rate, the income from the entire intrastate business of the rail-
road could be considered.21
Often, certain types of utilities sell appliances or engage in
18. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
19. Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois,
4 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1 (1934).
20. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915).
21. Id. at 599. "Frequently, attacks upon state rates have raised the
question as to the profitableness of the entire intrastate business under the
State's requirements. But the decisions in this class of cases . . . furnish no
ground for saying that the State may set apart a commodity or a special
class of traffic and impose upon it any rate it pleases, provided only that the
return from the entire intrastate business is adequate."
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other types of merchandising or jobbing. Generally, commissions
consider these activities separate and apart from the normal
utility operations for purposes of rate determination.22 Finally,
two types of utilities operated by the same company are consid-
ered separately. 23 A review of the above cases seems to indicate
that the degree of similarity between the basic product or basic
service of the utility and that product or service furnished under
the auxiliary agreement has been a substantial criterion for
determining whether the two activities should be treated as a
unit for rate determination.
It is true that situations such as the one in the instant case
are not common. The utility plant must be located close enough
to an industrial plant to make the furnishing of this type of
steam-electric energy practical. However, similar situations do
exist in California and New Jersey, and the commissions of those
states treat the private contracts as part of the operations of the
utilities, and include them in the determination of their profits.2 4
The Supreme Court of Louisiana refused to take this view,
saying, "we think it clear that its steam-electric business is, and
was always intended to be, a private enterprise separate and
apart from the normal utility service it renders the public. '25
Clearly this is a controversial subject, with persuasive argu-
ments on both sides of the question. It would seem, however,
that the Supreme Court might have attributed greater weight to
the judgment of the commission that this was a matter "concern-
ing the service to be given or rendered by the public utilities"26
and thus have eliminated a very complicated problem. The com-
mission is presumably in a better position to know the complete
situation and to appraise it in the light of greater experience.
Judicial relief would nonetheless be appropriate here in light of
the conclusion reached by the court that a rate of less than 6
per cent would be inequitable and unjust in the absence of excep-
tional circumstances.2 7
Albert L. Dietz, Jr.
22. Re Rates and Structures, 29 P.U.R. (N.S.) 391, 471. See also Colorado
Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 324 U.S. 581, 597 (1944).
23. Board of Trustees of Waterville v. Waterville G. & E. Co., 1917F,
P.U.R. 126 (1917). Where a company owned the gas works and electric
plant in the same city, the court refused to treat the two properties as a unit
for rate making purposes.
24. L.P.S.C. Order No. 5931, at 6.
25. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 62 So. 2d
250, 254 (La. 1952).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
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